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RECENT DECISIONS
the defendants all the protection the statute was intended to provide
while in People v. Malone the instruction tended to cancel its effect.
P. D. A.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - DECEDENT'S ESTATE - SFPARATION
AGREEMENT-GIFT INTER Vivos.-The claimant, the former wife of
the deceased, is seeking to recover from the executors money alleged
to be due her on a separation agreement between her and the de-
ceased, which at the request of the parties had been incorporated into
the divorce decree obtained by the claimant in the New Jersey Court
of Chancery.' The agreement provided that in lieu of alimony the
husband would pay the claimant one hundred dollars per month for
the support and maintenance of their son "as long as the said son
should continue to be a student at college." At the time of the
agreement the son was about to enter a college of liberal arts. After
graduating at the end of the four-year course, he continued, with his
father's knowledge, to take post-graduate work in universities in
Europe and in the United States, up to the time of his father's death.
The deceased paid to the claimant one hundred dollars for each school
month during the first four years. The claim is for the difference
between the amount received and the amount that would be due to
her at one hundred dollars per month with interest from the time
of the commencement of the payments in June, 1930 to December,
1937, the time the deceased passed away. The surrogate denied the
claim on the ground that there had been full payment by the deceased
under the agreement incorporated in the divorce decree on the basis
that a college year does not exceed ten months, and that four such
undergraduate years were all that were contemplated. The Appellate
Division modified the decree so as to allow the claimant one hundred
dollars per month for each of twelve months for each of four years.
Held, decree as modified by the Appellate Division affirmed. In re
Kelly's Estate, 285 N. Y. 139, 32 N. E. (2d) 62 (1941).
A separation agreement which has been made part of a final
divorce decree in a foreign jurisdiction is enforceable in New York
despite the fact that it is subject to revision by the court where it was
rendered.2 The constitutional requirement 3 that full faith and credit
shall be given to judgments and decrees of other states requires, where
applicable, that such states shall give to the decree such force and
'Divorce obtained on the grounds of desertion under New Jersey statute
(2 REV. STAT. C. 50).2 Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181 (1933);
Guggenheim v. Wahl, 203 N. Y. 390, 396, 397, 96 N. E. 726 (1911) ; Jones v.
Jones, 108 N. Y. 415, 15 N. E. 707 (1888).
3 U. S. CONsT. Art. IV, § 1.
1941)
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effect as it was entitled to receive in the state in which it was ren-
dered.4 In the instant case, the decree was neither modified nor was
it attacked at any time by the husband during his life. The obliga-
tion of the husband to support his wife continues during his life time
and under statute 5 in New York the husband cannot contract with
his wife to relieve him of his duty to support her.6 But agreements
under which the wife is paid a stipulated amount in lieu of all claims
against her husband's estate or of any claim for maintenance are not
against public policy if there is no fraud involved and the wife is not
overreached." A settlement made in discharge of the husband's duty
of maintenance is binding on his wife, if incorporated in the divorce
decree unless the wife can disaffirm for fraud or overreaching and
the like.8 Following these cases the agreement in the instant case
was held to be binding and the only question was as to the amount
due under the agreement. This depended on the interpretation of
the word "college" which the court found was properly decided by
the lower court to mean the regular four-year undergraduate course
and not to include by implication, post-graduate courses thereafter
in one or more professional schools, although more than four years
may be required in preparation for many professions and vocations
and for specialization in many fields leading to academic and higher
degrees.9 In an earlier case 10 a similar question was presented to
the court. This was in the construction of a trust created in a will
which stated that a trustee was "* * * to apply the income or as
much of the principal as the said trustee in his opinion he shall deem
necessary, for the proper education of my brother Daniel B. Wolf."
The key words here are "proper education", and the period of time
necessary for the acquisition of such "proper education" being the
period of time for the duration of the trust. The court considered
the character of the deceased and that of the brother and decided that
the words were used in their broadest sense so as to include not only
formal education but that which is acquired by living and studying
the things which we find in life. Following this interpretation the
court concluded that such an education would continue throughout
an entire lifetime and so the trust would likewise have to continue
throughout the man's life. In both these cases the court considered
the surrounding circumstances in order to determine the intent of the
parties. In the instant case it was shown that the wife was financially
able to pay for the education of her son, in fact that she had already
4 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 567, 26 Sup. Ct. 525 (1906).
5 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 51.
6 Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N. Y. 337, 18 N. E. (2d) 521 (1939).
7 hi re Browning's Estate, 153 Misc. 564, 276 N. Y. Supp. 270 (1934).
8 Helvering v. Leonard, 105 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) ; Greenfield v.
Greenfield, 161 App. Div. 573, 146 N. Y. Supp. 865 (1st Dep't 1914); N. Y.
Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 1155, 1170; N. Y. Dom. RF.L. LAW § 51.
9 See dissenting opinion by RiPPEy, J. in instant case, p. 143.
10In re Wolf's Estate, 164 Misc. 504, 299 N. Y. Supp. 99 (1937).
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expended an amount far in excess of the amount she could possibly
have received under the most liberal interpretation of the agreement.
The determining factor in arriving at the intent, in the case referred
to, was the character of the deceased and that of the brother which
showed an inclination toward unlimited study and education.
P. D. A.
EQUITY-RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-
WAIVER-ESTOPPEL-INJUNCTION.-Action for specific performance
of a covenant contained in a deed which conveyed certain premises in
Kew Gardens, upon which is now erected the Homestead Hotel. The
covenant prohibited the public sale of liquor and other alcoholic bev-
erages. The plaintiff reserved the right to cancel, modify or annul, in
whole or in part, the restrictive covenant. Plaintiff, pursuant to its
reservation, released restrictions on other parcels in the Kew Gardens
Development so as to permit the sale of intoxicating liquors in stores
and taverns. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendant from operating a
cocktail lounge and bar. Held, judgment for plaintiff reversed.
Where the grantor of the deed, allowing the construction of a hotel,
which was restricted by the covenant, knew that wine and beer were
sold at the hotel since 1933, but failed to take action for specific per-
formance of the restrictive covenant until September, 1940, at a time
when it knew that the defendants were in the process of constructing
a new cocktail lounge and bar, and it appeared that grantor had re-
leased other properties in the same tract from similar restrictions,
the grantor "waived" any right which it might have had to enforce
the restriction as against the hotel premises, and was "estopped" from
enforcing the restriction. Kew Gardens Corp. v. Ciro's Plaza, 261
App. Div. 576, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 553 (2d Dep't 1941).
Restrictive covenants are not favored by the law I as they are
repugnant to trade, commerce, and the free transfer of real property.
2
Because they are abhorred by the common law as a deterrant to the
land for all the lawful purposes which go with title and possession,3
it has been the policy of the courts to construe these covenants strictly
I Thompson v. Glenwood Community Club, 191 Ga. 196, 12 S. E. (2d) 623
(1940); Baltimore Butchers Abbatoir and Livestock Co. v. Union Rendering
Co., 17 4. (2d) 130 (C. A. Md. 1940); Whitmarsh v. Richmond, 20 A. (2d)
161 (C. A. Md. 1941) ; State ex rel. Bollenbeck v. Village of Shorewood Hills,
237 Wis. 50, 297 N. W. 568 (1941).
2 Hall v. Koehler, 148 S. W. (2d) 489 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1941); Bass v.
Hunter, 216 N. C. 505, 5 S. E. 558 (1939) ; Batchelor v. Hinle, 132 App. Div.
62, 117 N. Y. Supp. 620 (1st Dep't 1909) ; Getchal v. Lawrence, et al., 121 Misc.
359, 201 N. Y. Supp. 121 (1923).
3 Sharp v. Quinn, 214 Cal. 194, 4 P. (2d) 942 (1931).
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